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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal provides an excellent illustration of the 
difficulties that confront a claimant under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 29 U.S.C.S 621 
et seq. The plaintiff, Sandra G. Narin, applied for ten 
different teaching positions with the defendant, Lower 
Merion School District. The school district did not hire her 
for any of these positions, and it filled some of them with 
substantially younger applicants. 
 
Narin sought relief under the ADEA in a suit shefiled in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Lower Merion on nine of her eleven 
claims of discrimination brought pursuant to that Act. The 
remaining two claims were tried to a jury, which returned 
a verdict in favor of Lower Merion. Before the conclusion of 
the trial, Narin uncovered additional evidence that cast 
doubt on the propriety of some of the district court's 
summary judgment rulings. She did not, however, request 
the district court to reconsider its rulings or grant her a 
new trial on the basis of the newly discovered evidence. 
 
After the trial and entry of judgment, Narin timely 
appealed. Although this is a troublesome case, after hearing 
oral argument and carefully reviewing the record and briefs, 
we are constrained to affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Narin was born on April 2, 1941. From 1958 to 1962, she 
attended Bryn Mawr College where she earned a bachelor's 
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degree in Russian with honors. From 1962 to 1965, Narin 
attended the University of Pennsylvania where she received 
a doctorate in Russian language. From 1980 to 1983, Narin 
attended Villanova University School of Law where she 
acquired a law degree. In 1994, Narin obtained teaching 
certifications in French and Russian from Bryn Mawr 
College. In 1996, Narin also obtained a teaching 
certification in English from Eastern College. 
 
Narin completed her student teaching program in the 
Lower Merion School District during the Spring of 1994. 
Thereafter, she served as a .2 long term substitute French 
teacher in the Lower Merion School District for the 1994-95 
school year.1 This position, which was temporary from the 
start, was eliminated as planned at the end of the school 
year. Narin, however, continued to work as a per diem 
substitute in the Lower Merion School District for the next 
two school years. During the 1995-96 school year, Narin 
substituted on 118 days out of the 180-day school year. 
During the 1996-97 school year, Narin substituted on 130 
days. While working as a per diem substitute, Narin applied 
for ten different teaching positions in the Lower Merion 
School District. 
 
First, she applied to teach French in a foreign language 
pilot program to be implemented at Cynwyd Elementary 
School. ("Count I"). She applied for this position by sending 
a letter dated April 15, 1996 to William Kearns, the director 
of personnel for the Lower Merion School District. Kearns 
replied to Narin by letter dated April 17, 1996 and informed 
her that, if the school board approved the pilot program, a 
fractional teacher would be needed for the 1996-97 school 
year. Although the program was later approved, Narin was 
neither hired nor interviewed for the position. Sandra 
Dunn, to whom Kearns delegated the responsibility of 
selecting applicants for interviews, testified in her 
deposition that she did not remember reviewing Narin's 
application, but probably would not have been interested in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. ".2" designates that the position involved 20% of the workload handled 
by a full-time teacher. A "long term substitute position" arises when 
there is a need to fill an extended, albeit temporary, vacancy such as 
when a teacher takes maternity or paternity leave. 
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Narin because she (i.e., Dunn) "very clearly wanted 
someone who had experience teaching, if not elementary 
school, at least middle school." Jt. App. at 161. Marie 
Wells, age 34, was ultimately hired for the position. 
Although, like Narin, Wells lacked full-time elementary 
teaching experience, Wells had developed and run an after- 
school French program for second, third, and fourth 
graders. Wells also taught middle school from 1986 to 
1989. 
 
Second, Narin applied for a position as a "Challenge 
Teacher" at Cynwyd Elementary School. ("Count III").2 Narin 
first expressed interest in this position in her April 15, 
1996 letter to Kearns. At that time, however, the position 
was not yet posted, and Kearns did not respond to Narin's 
inquiries in regard to it. After the position was posted 
formally on April 25, 1996, Narin sent another letter to 
Kearns dated April 29, 1996, in which she reexpressed 
interest in the "Challenge Teacher" position. Again, 
however, Narin was not interviewed for the position. In his 
declaration in support of summary judgment, Kearns stated 
that Narin was neither hired nor interviewed for the 
position because she lacked experience teaching at the 
elementary school level and did not possess an elementary 
education certification. Lower Merion ultimately hired Jill 
Horak, age 43, who possessed both. 
 
Third, Narin applied "for the position of regular education 
teacher for all four major subjects in an alternative setting." 
("Count IV"). She did so by sending a letter to Kearns dated 
April 29, 1996. Narin was never interviewed or contacted in 
regard to this position. Throughout discovery and in its 
motion for summary judgment, Lower Merion, relying on 
Kearns' affidavit and deposition testimony, contended that 
the position did not exist. In response, Narin pointed to a 
portion of her deposition, in which she testified that she 
had read about the position in the paper and that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Narin first contended that there were two"Challenge Teacher" 
positions, and her complaint included two Counts (II and III) based on 
those positions. However, at summary judgment she only produced 
evidence that one such position existed. Accordingly, only the Count III 
"Challenge Teacher" position will be discussed in this opinion. 
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"Domenick someone" had been hired for it. 3 Narin also 
attached a copy of the formal posting for the position as an 
attachment to her sur-reply to Lower Merion's motion for 
partial summary judgment on the statute of limitations.4 
 
Fourth, at the suggestion of Nancy Pertschuk, the 
chairperson of the Harriton High School English 
Department, Narin applied for a position to teach English at 
Harriton High School for the 1996-97 school year. ("Count 
V"). She applied by sending a letter to Kearns dated July 
30, 1996. Narin was interviewed for the position on August 
1, 1996 by Pertschuk and Harriton High School's principal, 
Norton Seaman. Seaman, who possessed the authority for 
the hiring decision, subject to final approval by the 
superintendent, testified in his deposition that he chose 
Kathy Bress, age 38, over Narin because he believed that 
Bress performed better in her interview. Pertschuk, who 
stated that Narin was her first choice, also stated that 
Kathy Bress was on her "short list" for the position and 
that her leanings toward Narin probably reflected her 
friendship with Narin. 
 
Fifth, on October 21, 1996, Narin applied for a .6 long- 
term substitute position teaching French at Bala Cynwyd 
Middle School. ("Count VI"). Again, she did so by sending a 
letter to Kearns. Narin followed up with her application on 
several occasions. Between October and January, she made 
four phone calls to Lower Merion's personnel office in 
regard to the position, however, Narin was not interviewed 
until January 7, 1997. When she was interviewed, it was by 
Kearns and Dunn, who allegedly did not come away with a 
favorable impression. Both Kearns and Dunn stated that 
while they were impressed with Narin's academic 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 3. After summary judgment was entered against Narin, she learned the 
identity of the person actually hired. "Domenick someone" turned out to 
be Domenick Pavia, age 35. 
 
4. The posting, which ran in the April 28, 1996 Philadelphia Inquirer, 
stated: 
 
       Lower Merion School District has the following High School openings 
       for the 96-97 school year . . . Regular education but MULTI 
       CERTIFIED -- 6 -10 students teaching all four major subjects. Must 
       have experience teaching in an alternative setting. 
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background they were concerned by Narin's lack of middle 
school experience. The two also felt that Narin performed 
poorly in her interview. Ultimately, the two recommended 
Julia Proger, a 23-year old with no experience teaching 
middle school students. Narin testified in her deposition 
that during the interview, Dunn asked her whether she "as 
a person who is returning to teaching at [her] age, after so 
long a time, could possibly adapt to the new humanistic 
methods."5 
 
Sixth, on December 19, 1996, Narin applied for a .4 long- 
term substitute position teaching English at Bala Cynwyd 
Middle School. ("Count VII"). Again, she applied by sending 
a letter to Kearns. Lower Merion contends that by the time 
Kearns received Narin's application, it had already hired 
Andrew Thomas, age 24. 
 
Seventh, on March 9, 1997, Narin applied for a long-term 
substitute position teaching English at Lower Merion High 
School. ("Count VIII"). Again, she did so by sending a letter 
to Kearns. Narin was interviewed for the position on March 
19, 1997 by Dr. Maher, Lower Merion High School's 
principal, and Dr. Hay, Lower Merion's coordinator of 
language arts. Dr. Maher rated Narin's interview 
performance as average. Dr. Hay rated Narin's interview 
performance slightly higher, but expressed concern about 
Narin's lack of full-time English-teaching experience. 
Ultimately, Dr. Maher, who had authority to make the 
hiring decision, subject to approval by the superintendent, 
recommended Deborah Gavin, age 27, instead of Narin. Dr. 
Maher and Dr. Hay both rated Gavin's interview 
performance highly and thought Gavin an "excellent fit" for 
the position. 
 
Eighth, on May 12, 1997, Narin applied for a full-time 
position teaching English at Lower Merion High School. 
("Count IX"). Again, Narin did so by sending a letter to 
Kearns. Narin was granted an interview for the position. Dr. 
Maher, Lower Merion High School's principal, conducted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Narin also presented evidence that Kearns, during a 1996 faculty 
meeting, stated something to the effect that if anyone thought that Lower 
Merion hired only experienced teachers, one had but to look around at 
all the new young faces to dispel that idea. 
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the interviews for the position in July of 1997. Dr. Maher's 
first choice for the position was Marsha Pincus, age 45. 
Pincus, however, withdrew her name from consideration 
after she was selected as the top candidate. Dr. Maher then 
extended an offer to Deborah Gavin, age 27. Dr. Maher 
stated that he chose Gavin over Narin because Gavin 
performed better in her interview and because he had been 
favorably impressed with Gavin during her prior position as 
a long term substitute. 
 
Ninth, and also on May 12, 1997, Narin applied for a.8 
long-term substitute position teaching English at Harriton 
High School. ("Count X"). She expressed her interest in the 
position by sending a letter to Kearns. Narin was granted 
an interview for this position. Harriton High School 
principal Joel Bartolomeo, Lower Merion School District 
gifted education supervisor Cecil Frey, Harriton High School 
assistant principal William Loue, and student council 
president Benjamin Getto conducted the interviews for the 
position, including Narin's. Based on the interviews, the 
committee's first choice for the position was Rayna 
Goldfarb, age 51. When Goldfarb withdrew her name from 
consideration, the committee opted to extend an offer to 
Rita Lerario, age 49. Out of the five candidates interviewed 
for the position, the committee ranked Narin fourth. 
 
Tenth, on June 19, 1997, Narin applied for a Challenge 
Teacher position at Welsh Valley Middle School. ("Count 
XI"). Again, she was not hired. Lower Merion contends that 
it did not interview any candidates for this position. 
Instead, it asserts that when Frank Panaia, a 54-year old 
social studies teacher at Welsh Valley, applied for a 
transfer, Lower Merion offered him the position. 
 
Finally, Narin also alleged that she was not hired for a 
number of instructional aide positions. ("Count XII"). 
However, Narin does not identify any specific instructional 
aide position for which she applied and was not hired. 
 
Understandably, Narin was extremely frustrated by Lower 
Merion's repeated rejections of her applications. She 
believed the rejections to be a result of her age rather than 
her qualifications, and, on June 10, 1997, shefiled a 
charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 
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Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Commission ("PHRC"). After receiving a 
right to sue letter, Narin filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. In her complaint she alleged that Lower 
Merion's repeated refusals to hire her constituted age 
discrimination, in violation of the ADEA. 
 
After a lengthy period of discovery, Lower Merionfiled two 
motions for summary judgment: a motion for summary 
judgment on all counts and a motion for partial summary 
judgment based on the statute of limitations. In its motion 
for summary judgment on all counts, Lower Merion 
contended that with respect to each position for which 
Narin applied and was rejected, Narin either failed to 
establish a prima facie case or produced no evidence to 
suggest that Lower Merion's legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reasons for not hiring her were pretext. In its motion for 
summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, 
Lower Merion asserted that Counts I through V of Narin's 
complaint were time barred under 29 U.S.C. S 626(d)(2) 
because the alleged unlawful employment practices 
underlying these Counts occurred more than 300 days 
before Narin filed her complaint with the PHRC and the 
EEOC. 
 
The district court first considered Lower Merion's motion 
for summary judgment on all counts. It carefully reviewed 
the evidence produced during discovery and reached the 
following conclusions. First, with respect to Count IV, the 
district court determined that Narin failed to state a prima 
facie case of age discrimination because she produced 
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Count IV 
position had been filled with someone sufficiently younger 
to permit an inference of age discrimination. Next, with 
respect to Count III and Counts VII through XI, the district 
court determined that although Narin established a prima 
facie case as to these Counts, she failed to present evidence 
from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that 
Lower Merion's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for 
not hiring her were pretext for age discrimination. Finally, 
with respect to the instructional aide positions referred to 
in Count XII, the district court reasoned that Narin failed to 
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establish a prima facie case because she could not show 
that she applied for, or expressed interest in, these 
positions. 
 
After disposing of Lower Merion's motion for summary 
judgment on all counts, the district court turned to Lower 
Merion's motion for partial summary judgment based on 
the statute of limitations. Although the motion was directed 
at Counts I through V, the district court only addressed 
Counts I and V because it had already disposed of the other 
Counts in addressing Lower Merion's motion for summary 
judgment on all counts. As to Count I, the district court 
concluded that Lower Merion failed to demonstrate that 
Narin's cause of action accrued prior to the 300 day 
limitations period established by 29 U.S.C. S 626(d)(2). It 
therefore denied summary judgment on that Count. As to 
Count V, the district court found that Narin's cause of 
action had accrued outside of the 300 day limitations 
period and that the cause of action was therefore barred. 
 
The only Counts remaining, Counts I and VI, were tried 
to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Lower Merion. 
 
II. 
 
Narin contends that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment on Counts III through V and Counts VII 
through XII. With respect to Count IV, Narin contends that 
the district court incorrectly determined that she failed to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. With respect 
to Count III and Counts VII through XII, Narin argues that, 
although she failed to produce any evidence to demonstrate 
that Lower Merion's reasons for not hiring her for the 
positions underlying these Counts were pretext, the district 
court nevertheless erred in granting summary judgment on 
them because it "erroneously considered each rejected 
application in isolation from all others and ignored the 
principle that if some of the proffered reasons advanced by 
a defendant employer are prextextual, `a factfinder may 
rationally disbelieve the remaining proffered reasons, even 
if no evidence undermining those remaining rationales in 
particular is available.' " App. Br. at 7 (quoting Fuentes v. 
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 n. 7 (3d Cir. 1994)). As to Count 
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V, Narin argues that the district court incorrectly concluded 
that this claim was time barred under 29 U.S.C.S 626(d)(2). 
 
We undertake plenary review of the district court's grant 
of summary judgment, see Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763, and 
address each of Narin's contentions.6 
 
A. 
 
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination 
under the ADEA, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) she was 
over 40 at the time she applied for the position in question; 
(2) she was qualified for the position in question; (3) despite 
her qualifications she was rejected; and (4) the employer 
ultimately filled the position with someone sufficiently 
younger to permit an inference of age discrimination. See 
Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d 
Cir. 1995). Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 728 
(3d Cir. 1995). The district court concluded that Narin 
failed to establish a prima facie case as to Count IV 
because she could not establish that the position was filled 
by someone sufficiently younger to permit an inference of 
age discrimination. 
 
At the time the district court entered summary judgment 
on Count IV, Narin only presented evidence that"Domenick 
somebody" had been hired to fill the teacher in the 
alternative setting position. She did not know the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. As a preliminary matter, we note that counsel for Lower Merion has 
submitted a letter pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), 
in which he contends that the Supreme Court's decision in Kimel v. 
Florida Board of Regents, ___ U.S. #6D6D 6D#, 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000) renders 
the 
ADEA inapplicable to Lower Merion. This contention is meritless. In 
Kimel, the Supreme Court held "only that, in the ADEA, Congress did 
not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity to suits by private 
individuals." Lower Merion, however, is not a state or an arm of the state 
for eleventh Amendment purposes and therefore is not entitled to 
sovereign immunity. See Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 870-71 (3d 
Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923 (1991)(holding that school districts 
do not share in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity, because they are not alter egos of the 
Commonwealth)(citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 
429 U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977)). 
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individual's last name. Nor did she know his age. It was 
only after summary judgment was entered that Narin 
learned that "Domenick somebody" was actually Domenick 
Pavia, age 35. However, we do not understand Narin's 
argument on appeal to be that the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment on the basis of evidence she 
failed to present. Rather, we understand Narin to argue 
that her failure to produce the age and identity of the 
individual who ultimately filled the position should have 
been excused because she presented evidence at the 
summary judgment stage establishing that the Count IV 
position existed, thus severely undermining Lower Merion's 
repeated contention that the position did not exist. 
 Although we recognize that the elements of the prima 
facie discrimination case are not to be applied rigidly, see 
E.E.O.C. v. Metal Serv. Co., 892 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 
1990), we do not believe the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment. In producing the posting that 
established the existence of the Count IV position, Narin 
undoubtedly produced evidence suggesting that she had 
been treated unfairly by Lower Merion. But, to survive 
Lower Merion's motion for summary judgment Narin 
needed to do more than present evidence suggesting that 
she had been treated unfairly by the school district. She 
needed to present evidence suggesting that the unfair 
treatment she received was a result of her age. Because 
Narin presented no evidence that the Count IV position was 
filled by someone sufficiently younger than Narin, we 
cannot fault the district court for not finding that it could 
infer age discrimination. 
 
The appropriateness of the district court's decision to 
grant summary judgment on Count IV also is supported by 
Narin's failure to establish that she was qualified for the 
position: element two of the prima facie case. See Brewer, 
72 F.3d at 330. The Count IV position required a multi- 
certified teacher with experience in an "alternative setting." 
Although Narin possesses certifications in two foreign 
languages and in English, she lacks certification to teach 
mathematics and science. Perhaps certifications in 
mathematics and science were not necessary, but the 
burden to establish their irrelevance was Narin's. She failed 
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to present any evidence in this regard. In addition, Narin 
also failed to present evidence demonstrating that she had 
experience teaching in an "alternative setting," which the 
advertisement expressly required. Although the court will 
not countenance any unlawful discrimination because of 
age, we recognize that the district court must weigh 
carefully the evidence or lack thereof of discrimination. 
 
In sum, although we are disturbed by the actions of 
Lower Merion in insisting that the Count IV position did not 
exist, we do not believe that those actions, reprehensible as 
they may be, were sufficient to permit an inference of ADEA 
discrimination and excuse Narin's failure to establish two 
elements of the prima facie case.7 Accordingly, we are 
constrained to affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment as to Count IV. 
 
B. 
 
Narin next contends that the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment as to Count III and Counts VII 
through XII. In this connection, Narin does not argue that 
the district court incorrectly concluded that she failed to 
produce evidence specifically directed at undercutting the 
credibility of Lower Merion's legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reasons for not hiring her for the positions underlying these 
Counts. Rather she argues that summary judgment was 
inappropriate even in the absence of such evidence. 
Specifically, she asserts that the evidence of pretext with 
respect to Counts I, V, and VI coupled with the evidence of 
what she considers to be Kearns' central and deceptive role 
in the hiring process provided a sufficient basis from which 
a rational trier of fact could have concluded that all of 
Lower Merion's justifications for not hiring her were pretext. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We also note that when Narin uncovered the posting for the Count IV 
position, the proper course would have been to request a continuance to 
take additional discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Alternatively, when 
Narin learned the age and identity of "Domenick somebody" before the 
commencement of the trial, she also could have requested the district 
court to reconsider its grant of summary judgment on the Count IV 
position. 
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In support of her position, Narin principally relies on this 
Court's decision in Fuentes. In Fuentes , this Court held 
that "to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff's evidence 
rebutting the employer's proffered legitimate reasons must 
allow a factfinder reasonably to infer that each of the 
employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons . . . was 
either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually 
motivate the employment action." Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. 
However, in announcing this holding, we were careful to 
note that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to"cast doubt on 
each proffered reason in a vacuum." Id. at 764 n. 7. Rather, 
"[i]f the defendant proffers a bagful of legitimate reasons, 
and the plaintiff manages to cast substantial doubt on a 
fair number of them, the plaintiff may not need to discredit 
the remainder." Id. This is so "because the factfinder's 
rejection of some of the defendant's proffered reasons may 
impede the employer's credibility seriously enough so that 
a factfinder may rationally disbelieve the remaining 
proffered reasons, even if no evidence undermining those 
remaining rationales in particular is available." Id. at 764- 
765 n. 7. 
 
Lower Merion contends that this aspect of the Fuentes 
decision has no application to Narin's case. It argues that 
the above-quoted statements apply only in situations where 
the defendant offers several nondiscriminatory reasons for 
a single employment decision rather than where, as here, 
the defendant offers separate reasons for separate 
employment decisions. We need not decide the issue. Even 
if we were to give Fuentes the expansive reading that Narin 
suggests, Narin's evidence of pretext with respect to Counts 
I, V, and VI, even when coupled with the evidence of 
Kearns' central and allegedly hostile role in the hiring 
process, would not warrant reversal of summary judgment 
on the remaining Counts. 
 
First, we note that, although the district court concluded 
otherwise, Narin's evidence of pretext with respect to the 
Count V position (Harriton High School English Teacher) 
was insufficient as a matter of law. Principal Seaman, who 
possessed authority for the hiring decision, testified that he 
did not hire Narin for the Count V position because he felt 
that Narin did not perform as well in her interview as 
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another candidate, Kathy Bress. To demonstrate that this 
subjective justification constituted pretext, Narin principally 
relied on the deposition testimony of her other interviewer, 
Nancy Pertschuk. Pertschuk testified that she rated Narin's 
interview performance highly and considered Narin the top 
choice for the position. However, Pertschuk also testified 
that Kathy Bress was on her "short list" of two for the 
position and that her leanings toward Narin probably 
reflected that she was friends with Narin. Thus, rather than 
undercut Principal Seaman's justification for not hiring 
Narin, a decision made principally on the basis of a 
subjective interview, which is a ready tool for 
discrimination, Pertshuk's testimony tends to substantiate 
it.8 
 
Second, as to the positions underlying Counts VIII 
through XI, we do not see how Narin's evidence of pretext 
with respect to Counts I and VI, or her evidence that 
Kearns lied about the existence of the Count IV position, 
renders summary judgment inappropriate as to those 
Counts. At the time Narin applied for the positions 
underlying Counts VIII through XI, Narin had spoken with 
Kearns and expressed her suspicion that Lower Merion was 
discriminating against her on the basis of her age. After 
this discussion, Kearns automatically forwarded any 
application he received from Narin to the building principal 
responsible for the hiring decision. Narin then was 
interviewed by several different individuals, and the record 
is devoid of any evidence suggesting that the justifications 
of these decision makers for not hiring Narin amounted to 
pretext. Because Kearns had nothing to do with the 
decisions reached in these counts, his lack of credibility 
may not be attributed to the hiring decisions. Thus, without 
evidence of pretext relevant to the justifications for not 
hiring Narin for these positions, no rational trier of fact 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment as to Count V on the ground that Narin failed to produce 
sufficient evidence of pretext, rather than on the ground that the claim 
was time barred under 29 U.S.C. S 626. An appellate court may affirm 
a decision on a ground other than that relied on by the district court. 
Myers v. American Dental Assoc., 695 F.2d 716, 725 (3d Cir. 1982). 
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could find them unworthy of credence. See Fuentes, 32 
F.3d at 764.9 
 
Count XII likewise cannot be saved from summary 
judgment on the basis of Narin's evidence of pretext derived 
from Counts I, IV, and VI because Narin failed to establish 
a prima facie case with respect to Count XII. In her 
complaint Narin alleged that she was not hired for various 
instructional aide positions on the basis of her age. 
However, as the district court noted, the record is devoid of 
any evidence that Narin ever applied for these positions or 
expressed interest in them. Because she did not do so, she 
cannot predicate a claim of discrimination on Lower 
Merion's failure to hire her for those positions. See In re 
Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
Finally, turning to Counts III and VII, we again conclude 
that no rational trier of fact could find that Lower Merion's 
justifications for not hiring Narin for the positions referred 
to in these Counts were pretextual. As to Count III, Lower 
Merion produced evidence tending to demonstrate that it 
did not interview Narin because she lacked elementary 
school teaching experience as well as an elementary school 
certification. Discovery revealed that the individual 
ultimately hired for the position possessed both. As to 
Count VII, Lower Merion presented evidence that it did not 
hire Narin for the position because it had alreadyfilled the 
position by the time Narin applied for it. Narin produced no 
evidence to contradict this legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason. Although Kearns was involved in the screening of 
Narin's application for both of these positions, we do not 
believe his actions in connection with Counts IV and VI 
provide a sufficient basis from which a rational trier of fact 
could conclude that the reasons for not hiring Narin for the 
above positions amounted to pretext. We believe a court 
must exercise caution in permitting claims to proceed to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Moreover, we also think that as to Counts X and XI Narin failed to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Lower Merion hired Rita 
Lerario, age 49, and Frank Panaia, age 54, for the Count X and XI 
positions. Because these individuals' ages do not differ materially from 
Narin's, we cannot conclude that Lower Merion ultimately filled the 
Count X and XI positions with someone sufficiently younger to permit an 
inference of discrimination. See Brewer, 72 F.3d at 330. 
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trial on the basis of evidence of pretext presented in 
connection with other claims, and we therefore see no error 
in the district court's exercise of that caution here. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment as to Counts III and V and Counts VII 
through XII. 
 
III. 
 
In addition to her challenges to the district court's 
summary judgment rulings, Narin also challenges three 
evidentiary rulings of the district court. Where a party 
makes known the substance of the evidence she desires to 
introduce, we review the district court's decision to exclude 
the evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Walden v. 
Georgia Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 517 (3d Cir. 1997). 
However, where a party fails to make known the substance 
of the evidence she desires to introduce, we review only for 
plain error. See id. 
 
A. 
 
Narin first argues that the district court abused its 
discretion in excluding evidence related to Counts III and IV 
and Counts VII through XII. Specifically, she claims that 
"[t]he jury should have been permitted to hear evidence of 
pretext pertaining to one or more of the nine dismissed 
counts in evaluating the reasons proffered for the Count I 
and VI rejections." But, with respect to Count III and 
Counts VII through XII, Narin produced no evidence of 
pretext. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
by excluding evidence Narin simply did not have. As to 
Count IV, although Narin possessed evidence undermining 
the credibility of Kearns with respect to the Count IV 
position, the record does not disclose that Narin ever 
attempted to offer this evidence, and we perceive no plain 
error in the district court's failure to advise her to introduce 
the evidence. 
 
B. 
 
Narin's next argument is that the district court abused 
its discretion in excluding evidence of pretext produced in 
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connection with Count V. The district court excluded the 
evidence because it believed evidence of time barred claims 
inadmissible to show pretext. In our view, even assuming 
the district court's evidentiary ruling in this regard was 
erroneous, the error was harmless. First, as noted above, 
Narin's evidence of pretext with respect to Count V was 
insufficient as a matter of law and, therefore, not 
particularly helpful to establish pretext with respect to 
Counts I and VI. Second, even if Narin had produced 
evidence sufficient to undermine the credibility of Principal 
Seaman's justification for not hiring Narin for the Count V 
position, the evidence would still be irrelevant to Counts I 
and VI because Seaman had nothing to do with the 
decisions not to hire Narin for the positions underlying 
Counts I and VI. 
 
C. 
 
Narin's final evidentiary point is that the district court 
abused its discretion in excluding certain numerical 
evidence pertaining to Lower Merion's hiring practices. 
Specifically, Narin sought to introduce yearly lists 
containing the names and ages of the individuals hired by 
Lower Merion for every year beginning with 1986 and 
continuing through 1997. Narin asserts in this appeal, as 
she did in the district court, that the lists demonstrate that 
in 1992 Lower Merion began to hire substantially more 
teachers under the age of 35, and that this hiring practice 
continued at least until 1997. 
 
The district court permitted Narin to offer a list for the 
1996-97 school year, the time during which Narin was 
applying for jobs in the Lower Merion school district. 
However, it refused to permit Narin to introduce hiring lists 
for any other years on the ground that they were irrelevant. 
Again, we perceive no abuse of discretion. The lists Narin 
sought to introduce provided the ages of the individuals 
Lower Merion actually hired. In addition, the lists reflected 
that Lower Merion hired more individuals younger than 
forty years of age than older. However, we think these 
figures could only be probative of discriminatory intent if, 
at the very least, it also were shown that roughly equivalent 
numbers of over-forty and under-forty individuals applied 
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for employment with Lower Merion. Otherwise, the lists 
simply show that Lower Merion hires young individuals -- 
not that Lower Merion hires young individuals to the 
exclusion of older ones. 
 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the 
judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                18 
